Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain "facilities." All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a "trimness" condition is satisfied by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; conversely, if a facility is not trim, adding it to a potential game may destroy that property. In both congestion games and games with structured utilities, all facilities are trim. Under additional assumptions the potential attains its maximum, which is a Nash equilibrium of the game. MSC2010 Classification: 91A10; Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C 72.
Introduction
When Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduced the notion of a potential game, the main example they had in mind were Rosenthal's (1973) congestion games. Their Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 showed that a finite game admits an exact potential if and only if it can be represented as a congestion game (the sufficiency part was implicit in Rosenthal's reasoning). An alternative, more transparent proof was given in Voorneveld et al. (1999, Theorem 3.3) . Kukushkin (2007) introduced games with structured utilities, in a sense, "dual" to congestion games; the players there do not choose which facilities to use, only how to use facilities from a fixed list. The idea of such a structure of utility functions can be traced back to Germeier and Vatel' (1974) , although the local utilities in that paper were aggregated with the minimum function. Theorem 5 from Kukushkin (2007) showed that a strategic game admits an exact potential if and only if it can be represented as a game with structured utilities. Our basic construction is described in the following section. In Section 3, the key definitions of a trim facility and a trim game are given; Theorem 1 asserts the presence of an exact potential in every trim game. Theorem 2 in Section 4 shows kind of necessity of trimness for this property.
In Section 5, the question of when the potential attains its maximum is addressed. We formulate a list of assumptions ensuring the upper semicontinuity of the potential, and hence the existence of a Nash equilibrium (Theorem 3). The proof of the theorem is in Section 6. Section 7 demonstrates that the Le Breton-Weber construction is, indeed, a particular case of ours. In Section 8, we show that every game from each class considered by Harks et al. (2011) can be naturally represented as one from our class. Section 9 summarizes the message of the paper.
Basic definitions
A strategic game Γ is defined by a finite set N of players, and, for each i ∈ N , a set X i of strategies and a real-valued utility function u i on the set X N := ∏ i∈N X i of strategy profiles. We denote N := 2 N \{∅} and X I := ∏ i∈I X i for each I ∈ N . Given i, j ∈ N , we use notation X −i instead of X N \{i} and X −ij instead of X N \{i,j} .
A function P : X N → R is an exact potential of Γ (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) if
whenever i ∈ N , y N , x N ∈ X N , and y −i = x −i . If x 0 N ∈ X N maximizes P over X N , then, obviously, x 0 N is a Nash equilibrium.
A game with (additive) common local utilities (a CLU game) may have an arbitrary finite set N of players and arbitrary sets of strategies X i (i ∈ N ), whereas the utilities are defined by the following construction. First of all, there is a set A of facilities; we denote B the set of all (nonempty) finite subsets of A. For each i ∈ N , there is a mapping B i : X i → B describing what facilities player i uses having chosen x i . Every strategy profile x N determines local utilities at all facilities α ∈ A; each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities over chosen facilities. The exact definitions need plenty of notations.
For every α ∈ A, we denote
without restricting generality, we may assume
The total utility function of each player i is
Both games with structured utilities and congestion games are CLU games. In the former case, for each i ∈ N , the set B i (x i ) is the same for all x i ∈ X i ; hence I(α, x N ) does not depend on the second argument and hence the first argument of φ α can be dropped. In the latter case, X i ⊆ B for each i ∈ N , each B i is an identity mapping, and hence the second argument of φ α can be dropped; besides, φ α only depends on #I. Note that A is finite in both cases, which is not required generally.
Trim facilities and games
For every α ∈ A, we denote n − (α) := min I∈Iα #I = max{1, #I − α }.
We call a facility α ∈ A trim if there is a real-valued function ψ α (m) defined for integer m between n − (α) and
whenever I ∈ I α , I ̸ = I + α , and x I ∈ X α I . In other words: whenever a trim facility is not used by all potential users, neither the identities of the users, nor their strategies matter, only the number of users. A term like "quasi-Rosenthal facility" might be justified, but it seems too cumbersome.
The property can also be defined as invariance of the local utility function to certain manipulations with its arguments. Proposition 1. A facility α ∈ A is trim if and only if these two conditions are satisfied:
(J = ∅ is allowed in both conditions, in which case the term x J should be just ignored).
Proof. The implication "only if" is obvious; let α ∈ A satisfy both conditions (4). If (3) is not required for any I ∈ I α . Therefore we may assume that I − α ⊂ I + α . Whenever I ∈ I α , I ̸ = I + α , and x I , y I ∈ X α I , we can, picking, one by one, i ∈ I and replacing x i with y i , obtain, by (4a), that φ α (I, x I ) = φ α (I, y I ), i.e., the choice of strategies does not matter indeed.
Let us show the irrelevance of the identities of users. If
by the argument of the preceding paragraph. There is no other I ∈ I α with the same #I. If I − α = ∅, we set ψ(1) := φ α ({i}, x i ), which does not depend on i ∈ I + α by (4b) with J = ∅, or on x i ∈ X α i by the argument of the preceding paragraph again. Finally, supposing that I, J ∈ I α , n − (α) < #I = #J < #I + α , x I ∈ X α I and y J ∈ X α J , we have to prove that φ α (I, x I ) = φ α (J, y J ). Obviously, there is a one-to-one correspondence between J \ I := {j 1 , . . . , j k } and I \ J := {i 1 , . . . , i k }. Consecutively applying (4b), we obtain:
Now we can set ψ(m) := φ α (I, x I ) for an arbitrary I ∈ I α with #I = m and an arbitrary x I ∈ X α I , and have (3) satisfied.
We call a CLU game trim if so is every facility. It is instructive to check that both congestion games and games with structured utilities are trim. In the first case, (3) holds for all I ∈ I α , even for I = I + α ; in the second case, conversely, I − α = I + α for each facility α and hence (3) is not required at all. Theorem 1. Every trim CLU game admits an exact potential.
; since N and each B i (x i ) are finite, A(x N ) is finite too. Now we define our potential function in this way:
Given i ∈ N and
Once we show that
for all i ∈ N and x N ∈ X N , Theorem 2.1 of Voorneveld et al. (1999) will imply that P is an exact potential.
Since α is trim, we have φ α ({j}, x j ) = ψ α (1) and hence total contributions coincide again. Finally, if #I(α, x N ) > 2, we argue virtually in the same way as in the previous case of #I(α, x N ) = 2. Equality (7) being satisfied, Theorem 1 is proven.
Remark. In the case of a game with structured utilities, the second sum in (5) disappears since
Thus, the potential defined by (5) coincides with that defined in the proof of sufficiency in Theorem 4 from Kukushkin (2007) . In the case of a congestion game, φ α (I(α, x N ), x I(α,x N ) ) = ψ α (#I(α, x N )) and hence the potential defined by (5) coincides with Rosenthal's potential.
Necessity of trimness
Let a finite set N of players be fixed. An autonomous facility α is defined by two subsets
α may be empty], a set X α i of relevant strategies for each i ∈ I + α , and a local utility function
}, exactly as in Section 2. We call an autonomous facility α trim if it satisfies the same condition (3).
Let α be an autonomous facility, and let Γ be a CLU game with the same set N , a set A such that α / ∈ A, and X i ∩ X α i = ∅ for each i ∈ N . A CLU game Γ * is called an extension of Γ with α if these conditions are satisfied:
Remark. It is important to note that there may be various extensions of the same game Γ with the same facility α. Two other features of the definition are also worth mentioning. First, we allow some strategies available in Γ to become unavailable in Γ * , and some strategies from X α i (for i ∈ I + α ) may also be unavailable. Second, each player i ∈ I + α may have an option of choosing the "new" facility α, forgetting the "old" game Γ altogether. A straightforward modification of our definition would dispense with either feature or both; Theorem 2 would remain correct since neither is invoked in the proof. 
Proof of Claim 2.1. Let us consider a congestion game Γ with the same set N of players, a singleton set of facilities A := {β}, and a singleton set of strategies X h := {x 
To avoid too cumbersome notations, we allowed a small discrepancy with the general definition of an extension of a CLU game. Strictly speaking, the strategy set of each player h ∈ I − α in Γ * is X α h × X h , which can be identified with X α h because of an obvious one-to-one correspondence
Since we assumed Statement 3 to hold, Γ * admits an exact potential; hence so does every subgame. As was noted by Monderer and Shapley (1996 
, we obtain the following matrix of the resulting subgame:
Straightforward calculations show that P (x 
, we obtain the following matrix:
. In other words, (4b) is established.
A reference to Proposition 1 completes the proof of the implication Statement 3 ⇒ Statement 1. The proof of the implication Statement 4 ⇒ Statement 1 is now straightforward: the congestion game Γ used in the proofs of Claims 2.2 and 2.1 can as well be perceived as a game with structured utilities. Theorem 2 is proven.
Theorem 2 takes it for granted that the players sum up their local utilities. Actually, the necessity (in a sense) of addition was showed in Kukushkin (2007) : If the players may aggregate local utilities with arbitrary (continuous and strictly increasing) functions, then the existence of an exact potential is ensured regardless of other characteristics of the game only if the players sum up local utilities; that statement remains valid when attention is restricted to congestion games (Theorem 2 of Kukushkin, 2007) , or to games with structured utilities (Theorem 4).
Strictly speaking, those theorems do not exclude the possibility that the aggregation of local utilities with some other, non-strictly increasing functions might also ensure the existence of an exact potential, but there is no reason to expect anything interesting here. On the other hand, the minimum aggregation, as envisaged by Germeier and Vatel' (1974) , ensures the acyclicity of coalitional improvements and hence the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium (Harks et al., 2013; Kukushkin, 2017) .
The existence of Nash equilibrium
To ensure that the potential P attains a maximum, some additional assumptions are needed. The simplest approach would be to have X N compact and P upper semi continuous. As was noted by Le Breton and Weber (2011) even in a much less general case, a certain degree of subtlety is required, however, since even the continuity of every φ α does not imply the upper semicontinuity of the potential.
Assumption 1. The set of facilities A and each strategy set X i are metric spaces; each mapping B i is continuous in the Hausdorff metric on the target; for every α ∈ A and I ∈ I α , the function φ α (I, ·) : X I → R is upper semicontinuous.
Henceforth, we assume each set X I (I ∈ N ) to be endowed with the maximum metrics. For each i ∈ N and m ∈ N, we denote
Assumption 2. For each i ∈ N and m ∈ N, either X
m i = ∅ or X m i is a compact subset of X i .
Assumption 3. For each i ∈ N , X m i ̸ = ∅ only for a finite number of m ∈ N.
Assumptions 1 -3 have a technical implication useful in the following.
Proof. By Assumption 3, there is a finite number of possible values of #B i (x k i ); therefore, we must have x k i ∈ X m i for some m ∈ N, m ̸ = 0, and an infinite number of k ∈ N. Since X m i is compact by Assumption 2, and hence closed in X i , we have x ω i ∈ X m i too. It follows immediately that such an m must be unique, i.e., x k i ∈ X m i for all k ∈ N large enough. By Assumption 1, we have
Our final assumption combines some sorts of upper semicontinuity (of φ α "in α") and monotonicity (of φ α "in I").
Assumption 4.
For every α ∈ A, I ∈ I α , and ε > 0, there is δ > 0 such that: If A is finite as, e.g., in a game with structured utilities or in a congestion game, then Assumption 4 holds vacuously since a δ > 0 smaller than the minimal distance between α ̸ = β can be chosen.
Theorem 3. Every trim CLU game satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 possesses a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.
The proof is deferred to Section 6. It is impossible to argue that the assumptions imposed in Theorem 3 are necessary in a proper sense. After all, neither upper semicontinuity, nor compactness are necessary for a function to attain its maximum. Nonetheless, dropping any one of them makes the theorem wrong. There is no need to discuss Assumption 1, but for the three others, appropriate counterexamples follow. In Examples 1 and 2, even one-player games suffice. N) , which is actually a singleton. And again, there is no Nash equilibrium, i.e., maximum of u 1 , since sup x 1 ∈X 1 u 1 (x 1 ) = +∞. 
Proof of Theorem 3
As was hinted at the start of Section 5, our strategy is to show that P defined by (5) is upper semicontinuous on a compact X N . Then any strategy profile which maximizes P will be a Nash equilibrium.
The compactness of X N immediately follows from Assumptions 2 and 3. Let
. Now Lemma 1 applies; therefore, we may, without restricting generality, assume that
, and k ∈ N [we should have written β k i (α), but β k i related to different α's will never be considered simultaneously]. Note that β k i → α for each i ∈ N . Since there is a finite number of possible values of I(β k i , x k N ), we may, without restricting generality, assume that, given i ∈ I(α, x ω N ), the set I(β k i , x k N ) is the same for all k. Similarly, we may assume that
Now we are ready to analyze and compare the right-hand side of (5) 
and for
] to (9a) [the term in square brackets disappears if #I = n − (α)] and
] to (9b); since φ α (I, ·) is upper semicontinuous by Assumption 1, there is no problem with this α. 
[The terms in square brackets disappear if, respectively, #Ī = n − (α) or #I(i) = 1; we divide the rightmost sum in (10a) by #I(i) to compensate for multiple counting of the same terms.] The contribution of the same α to (9b) is
Taking into account Assumption 4 and the fact thatĨ(α, x ω N ) ⊆ I(α, x ω N ), we see that the upper limit of (10a) cannot be greater than (10b).
The upper semicontinuity of P is proven, and so is the theorem.
Le Breton-Weber construction
First, we reproduce the construction in somewhat streamlined notations. All strategy sets X i are compact subsets of a Euclidean space R T ; X = ∪ i∈N X i . Given a strategy profile x N ∈ X N and x ∈ X, we denote n(x, x N ) the number of players with x i = x. The payoff U i (x N ) of player i is the sum of three terms ("taste component," "local social interaction component," and "global social interaction component"):
Three substantial assumptions are made:
is increasing for all x ∈ X. Under those assumptions, Le Breton and Weber (2011) showed that the following function is an upper semi-continuous exact potential:
Given a Le Breton-Weber game Γ, we denote N 2 the set of all unordered pairs in N , i.e., subsets of cardinality 2. Then we define a CLU game Γ * by A * := N ∪N 2 ∪X;
Proposition 2. For every Le Breton-Weber game Γ, the CLU game Γ * just defined is trim and isomorphic to Γ. Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied for Γ * . Moreover, the exact potential (5) for Γ * coincides with potential (12) for Γ.
A straightforward proof is omitted.
Remark. Actually, Assumptions 1-4 were developed as a generalization of the assumptions of Le Breton and Weber (2011) .
Player-specific local utilities
Congestion games with player-specific local utilities are a natural generalization of Rosenthal's (1973) model. Typically, one cannot expect the existence of an equilibrium, to say nothing of an exact potential, in such games. Nonetheless, there are results on the existence of a Nash equilibrium (Milchtaich, 1996) or even a strong Nash one (Konishi, et al., 1997) in some particular cases. Sometimes, even an exact potential exists; the most advanced results to this effect are due to Harks et al. (2011) . In this section, we show that our construction generates all potential games discovered in that paper and some more. Harks et al. (2011) started with "weighted congestion games," where the strategy sets are X i ⊆ B, as in proper congestion games, B i 's are identity mappings, each player is characterized by a "demand" d i ∈ R, and the (player-specific) local utility function at each facility α ∈ A is
; in other words, each player's load is multiplied by the unit cost depending on the total load on the facility. Note that local utilities become common if each player's utility is divided by d i ; however, the trimness condition need not hold.
Then (on pp. 66-69), two extensions of the model are considered, where local utilities are not common in an essential way. In the first, "weighted congestion games with facility-dependent demands," the demand of each player is additionally parameterized by the facility, so the local utility function of player i at facility
In the second, "weighted congestion games with elastic demands," the demand of each player is uniform over facilities, but may be chosen by the player from a feasible set, d i ∈ D i , so the local utility function of player i at facility α ∈ A is again
, but the strategy sets are X i × D i . Every weighted congestion game obviously belongs to both extended classes.
Generally, a game from either class need not admit an exact potential; however, it does so in the case of affine local unit cost functions,
In the following, we assume that affine local cost functions are included in all the three above definitions, although Harks et al. (2011) did not do that.
We consider an even more general model, which simultaneously includes both extensions as particular cases. There is a finite set N of players and an arbitrary set A of facilities; we denote X the set of x = ⟨x α ⟩ α∈A ∈ R A such that B(x) := {α ∈ A | x α ̸ = 0} is finite. For each player i ∈ N , there is a strategy set X i ⊆ X and a function F i : X i → R; for every α ∈ A, there are constants a α , b α ∈ R. Given a strategy profile x N ∈ X N , the local utility obtained by player i from a facility α is
The total utility function is
We may say that the players belonging to the set I(α,
, so we could write φ α i (x α I(α,x N ) ) in the left hand side of (13) and the right hand side of (14). Now we see that (14) can be viewed as a generalization of (2) where different players may extract different local utilities from the same facility. By an analogy with Harks et al. (2011) , we may call such models generalized weighted congestion games with controllable demands (and affine local unit cost functions), or, for brevity, games with controllable demands (CD games).
if D α i ⊂ R + for all i ∈ N and α ∈ A, while b α , a α > 0 for all α ∈ A. In other words, it is natural in this case to restrict attention to positive externalities (Le Breton and Weber, 2011 , have already come to the same conclusion in their situation). Harks et al. (2011) also showed the necessity of affine local unit costs for the guaranteed existence of a potential; it does not seem possible to derive the fact from our Theorem 2. On the other hand, if we drop the idea that the unit costs should be the same for all users of a given facility, then polylinear combinations with symmetric coefficients would be acceptable as well. For instance, consider local utility functions of the form Virtually the same argument as above shows that such a game is isomorphic to a trim CLU game and hence admits an exact potential. One may doubt that such cost functions could adequately describe any real-world interrelationships; but an interesting point is that they also emerge in the study of Cournot tâtonnement in aggregative games with monotone best responses (Kukushkin, 2005) .
Conclusion
Let us summarize our main findings. It is, in principle, possible to allow the players in a congestion game to choose some additional parameters beside the facilities they use (e.g., type of vehicle, load, etc.) without destroying the presence of an exact potential. The "only" restriction is that those additional parameters should not affect the local utility unless all players able to use the facility actually show up. Games with structured utilities fit here since each player uses the same list of facilities under every strategy.
This generalization allowed us to include the classes of potential games considered by Le Breton and Weber (2011) and Harks et al. (2011) into the same general scheme; moreover, a wider class of congestion-style games with player-specific local utilities also fits in. It seems quite possible that still other examples could be found as well, but, so far, I have been unable to produce anything specific.
